Are Arms Embargoes Against Türkiye Lawful? Defense Trade, Export Controls and the Equal Application of Law

Why It Matters

Arms embargoes are lawful in international law in two distinct ways. The UN Security Council can impose them under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which binds every member state. A state can also decline to export weapons as a sovereign national choice. No treaty gives any buyer, ally or not, a right to purchase arms, so the legal contest usually turns on a narrower question: whether restrictions follow published criteria and are applied equally to comparable buyers. That question of equality is the core of Türkiye's case.

Background

The legal sources of arms export restrictions

Five layers of rules govern whether a state may withhold or block arms transfers. They differ in legal force, and the details vary by country.

• UN Security Council sanctions. Article 41 of the UN Charter allows the Council to order measures short of force, including arms embargoes, and Article 25 obliges members to carry them out. Embargoes have been applied to places such as Somalia, Libya, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and others, each through a specific resolution.
• The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013 and in force since 24 December 2014, it bans transfers that would breach Security Council measures or other treaty obligations, or that would facilitate genocide, crimes against humanity or grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Article 6). For other transfers, Article 7 requires an exporter to assess the risk that the arms would undermine peace and security or be used for serious violations of humanitarian or human rights law. The treaty binds only its states parties, and major exporters and importers differ in whether they have joined.
• The EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. It sets eight criteria for member states' export licences, including respect for international obligations, human rights and humanitarian law, the internal situation of the recipient, regional peace and stability, the national security of member states and of friendly and allied countries, the buyer's conduct toward international law, and the risk of diversion. The Council updated its operating framework in 2019. Decisions on individual licences remain national.
• National licensing law. Every major exporter runs its own system, such as the US Arms Export Control Act and ITAR, or Germany's War Weapons Control Act and foreign trade law. Parliaments and executives can add political conditions that no treaty requires.
• Export-control regimes. The Wassenaar Arrangement, in which Türkiye participates, coordinates control lists among participating states. It is a political arrangement and is not legally binding.

Binding embargo versus political measure

A national embargo is generally treated in international law as a lawful act of discretion, sometimes called retorsion, unless it breaches a specific obligation such as a supply contract, a bilateral defense agreement or a trade-treaty commitment.

Chronology of restrictions affecting Türkiye

Several European restrictions were later eased or quietly reviewed, a reminder that these are policy decisions rather than fixed legal bars.

Key Players & Positions

States that restrict exports

The governments that limited exports in 2019 grounded their decisions in their own licensing law and the EU Common Position. They cited the humanitarian situation in northern Syria and regional stability (criteria 2 and 4). EU foreign ministers' conclusions of 14 October 2019 stressed that arms export decisions remain a national responsibility. They did not constitute an EU-wide embargo.

The United States has grounded its measures in domestic law. It argued that the S-400 air-defence system could not be integrated with NATO systems and posed a risk to the F-35. CAATSA is a US statute, and the sanctions on the SSB were an exercise of US national law with external economic effects.

The UN system

The Security Council has never adopted an arms embargo against Türkiye. Critics raise a separate issue, the Libya arms embargo (Resolution 1970 of 2011, as extended). UN Panel of Experts reports on Libya have named several outside actors, including Türkiye. Ankara rejects the charge, saying its military cooperation (the 27 November 2019 memorandum and related support) was given at the request of the internationally recognized Libyan government.

Civil society and parliaments

Human rights organizations and some legislators argue that ATT Article 7 and Common Position criterion 2 create a duty to withhold licences whenever a serious risk of violations exists. They see the 2019 measures as compliance rather than politics.

Türkiye's Legal Stance

Türkiye's Legal Stance (Ankara's official position as expressed in Foreign Ministry and Presidency statements)

• No binding basis exists. Ankara argues that no Security Council resolution authorizes an embargo on Türkiye. The restrictions it faces are national and political, so they must be justified under each state's own published criteria, not as an international obligation. (Source: statements of the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs after October 2019.)
• Self-defense is a protected right. Türkiye notified the Security Council of its cross-border operations under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It argues that export decisions that treat counter-terrorism action against the PKK/YPG (designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union) as aggression distort the ATT and Common Position tests. See The Law of Force on the Southern Border and the sister analysis Article 51 of the UN Charter and Türkiye's Cross-Border Operations. (Source: Türkiye's letters to the UN Security Council; Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)
• Allied obligations run both ways. Türkiye has been a NATO member since 1952. Ankara points to the Treaty of Washington's Article 3 (mutual aid and continuous effort to strengthen individual and collective capacity) and Article 5, and argues that national embargoes on an ally conflict with the spirit of the Alliance. It also cites the 1975–1978 US embargo as a historical precedent that harmed allied cohesion. (Source: Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye and Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements; North Atlantic Treaty text.)
• Equal application is the legal yardstick. Ankara argues that Article 7 of the ATT and the Common Position criteria must be applied evenly to every buyer. In its view, comparable conflicts involving other recipients have not drawn comparable restrictions. This echoes Türkiye's wider case for even-handed institutions, set out in The World Is Bigger Than Five, and its impartial application of treaties such as Montreux (see Montreux Convention and Belligerent Warships). (Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)
• Strategic autonomy is a lawful response. Türkiye's roughly 80% domestic production rate, from the Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı unmanned aircraft to the KAAN fighter, MİLGEM warships and HİSAR-O and SİPER air-defence systems, is presented as the outcome of unreliable supply since 1975. It is not described as an attempt to circumvent any rule. (Source: Presidency of Defense Industries and Presidency statements.) For the production figures, see Monitor of Nations on domestic production.

Assessing the legal weight of these arguments

A national embargo on a NATO ally is lawful in the same way a refusal to sign a trade deal is lawful. The NATO treaty does not create a supply entitlement, and Ankara does not claim one. What Ankara contests is selectivity. Sovereign equality under Article 2(1) of the UN Charter and the ATT's insistence on objective, non-discriminatory assessment give the equality argument a basis in principle. It still operates mainly as a standard of consistency and credibility, and a court would find it hard to enforce.

The practical record cuts both ways. Türkiye's industry did reduce exposure to single suppliers, and domestic sensors, engines and weapons now sit on several platforms. Some critical subsystems still depend on foreign engines or components. Restrictions tend to target exactly those inputs, which is why Ankara's aim remains full indigenization of critical subsystems. See also Defense Exports and Technology Transfer and Türkiye in NATO.

Source Comparison

Readers can compare the primary documents directly: the ATT text, Decision 2008/944/CFSP, the 14 October 2019 EU Council conclusions, and Turkish Foreign Ministry statements. Our Editorial Principles explain how we cite and check sources.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Arms embargo: a ban on arms transfers. It is binding only if imposed by the UN Security Council or required by treaty.
• Retorsion: a lawful but unfriendly act, such as withholding exports, that breaches no international obligation.
• ATT Article 7 assessment: the exporter's case-by-case risk test before authorizing a transfer.
• Common Position criteria: eight EU benchmarks applied by member states' licensing authorities.
• Secondary sanctions: measures with extraterritorial economic reach, such as CAATSA.
• Strategic autonomy: the capacity to produce and sustain critical defense systems independent of foreign approvals.

Related guides: Nomos Orbis home, Mediation in Legal Form, About Nomos Orbis, and Neutralizing Terrorism at Its Source.

Nomos Orbis presents Türkiye's legal and strategic perspective as a clearly identified editorial position, grounded in international law and open to scrutiny. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official archives and court records, which readers are encouraged to verify directly.