Mediation in Legal Form: How Istanbul's Agreements and Prisoner Exchanges Were Structured

Why It Matters

Türkiye mediated between Russia and Ukraine mainly by hosting, convening and co-signing, not by adjudicating. The clearest example is the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia and Ukraine never signed a text with each other, and each instead signed a mirror agreement with Türkiye and the United Nations. That structure explains why the arrangement could be launched within weeks, why it delivered roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and foodstuffs, and why it could also be suspended unilaterally.

This article looks at the legal form of Türkiye's mediation rather than retelling the chronology, which is covered in sister analyses such as The Global Anatomy's study of Montreux and the grain initiative and Crossroads Review's account of the war-time mediation.

Background

Three layers of mediation

Türkiye's role in the Russia–Ukraine war operated on three legally distinct layers:

1. Political convening. The Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers met with Türkiye's foreign minister in Antalya on 10 March 2022. Delegations then met in Istanbul on 29 March 2022. Those talks produced proposals and communiqués, but no signed treaty. Press reports years later described a draft text on Ukrainian neutrality and security guarantees that was never concluded.
2. A binding-in-practice commercial and humanitarian package. The Black Sea Grain Initiative, signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022.
3. Humanitarian exchanges. Prisoner and body repatriations, facilitated by Türkiye and other intermediaries, including the direct Istanbul rounds of May–July 2025.

The legal instruments of 22 July 2022

Instrument	Parties	Function
Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports (Ukrainian-side text)	Ukraine, Türkiye, United Nations	Safe corridor and port operations from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi
Same initiative (Russian-side text)	Russian Federation, Türkiye, United Nations	Mirror commitments, including Russian acceptance of the inspection and corridor regime
Memorandum of Understanding on Russian food and fertilizer exports	Russian Federation, UN Secretariat	Separate UN undertaking to help Russian agricultural exports reach world markets

The parallel-text design allowed each side to avoid a document signed directly with its adversary. Each party's obligations were owed to the UN and Türkiye as co-signatories, and the texts were operationally linked through the shared coordination mechanism.

The coordination mechanism

The initiative created a Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul with senior representatives of Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN. Its core functions were:

• agreeing vessel registration and sequencing;
• organizing joint inspections of inbound and outbound vessels at anchorage near Istanbul, to verify that inbound ships carried no weapons and outbound ships carried only agreed cargo;
• coordinating movement through a maritime humanitarian corridor, with parties undertaking not to attack vessels or port facilities;
• reporting through the UN, whose coordinator and Secretary-General held the public-reporting role.

The initial term was 120 days. It was renewed in November 2022, then again in March and May 2023 for shorter periods. Russia announced its suspension of participation on 17 July 2023, stating that parts of the parallel MoU on its own exports had not been implemented. Ukraine, the UN and many states argued that the grain deal should continue regardless. UN figures put cargo at roughly 33 million tonnes moved over about a year.

The Montreux layer

Separately from the grain texts, the 1936 Montreux Convention governs passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. In late February 2022, Türkiye notified that war conditions existed and applied Article 19, which restricts passage of warships of belligerent states (with the Convention's exception for vessels returning to their home bases). Merchant shipping remained covered by the Convention's freedom-of-transit provisions, which is why Türkiye could host grain-ship inspections without closing the Straits to commerce.

Prisoner exchanges: a different legal register

Prisoner exchanges are governed by the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, which provides for repatriation of seriously wounded and sick prisoners during hostilities (Article 109) and release and repatriation after active hostilities cease (Article 118). Mediators do not hold prisoners or enforce exchanges; they facilitate agreements that the detaining powers carry out, with the International Committee of the Red Cross playing its own neutral role.

Two Turkish-linked episodes illustrate the form:

• In September 2022, five Ukrainian commanders were transferred into Turkish custody as part of a wider exchange. Russian and Ukrainian officials publicly said they would remain in Türkiye until the end of hostilities. They returned to Ukraine in July 2023, which drew Russian objections that the arrangement had been breached.
• In May 2025, delegations met directly in Istanbul for the first time in the war since 2022, and the sides agreed an exchange of 1,000 prisoners each. Further Istanbul rounds in June and July 2025 dealt with young and seriously ill detainees and with the return of bodies.

Key Players & Positions

• Russia. Moscow accepted the grain package on the condition that its own food and fertilizer exports were facilitated. According to Russian foreign ministry statements, its July 2023 suspension followed non-implementation of that second track, including problems with banking and shipping access. Russia has also said Istanbul is an acceptable venue for direct talks.
• Ukraine. Kyiv has treated the maritime corridor as vital to its export economy and food security. According to Ukrainian official statements, it insists that any political settlement respect its territorial integrity, and it has consistently argued that the grain corridor should not depend on Russian consent.
• United Nations. The Secretary-General's office signed the texts, staffed the JCC and reported publicly on cargo volumes. The UN's role was administrative and monitoring-based, resting on Charter Article 33, which names mediation among the peaceful means of dispute settlement.
• United States and European Union. Both supported the initiative and the UN's role while maintaining sanctions on Russia. Their concern, according to official statements, was to keep the food track separate from the sanctions regime.
• Türkiye. Türkiye signed both mirror texts, hosted the JCC and handled inspection logistics through its national defence and maritime authorities. Its approach is set out below.

Türkiye's Legal Stance

Türkiye's Legal Stance

• Neutral-in-process, principled on sovereignty. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Türkiye supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and does not recognize the annexation of Crimea. It voted for UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/1 (2 March 2022). It has also declined to join the Western sanctions regime. Ankara argues that this combination keeps it credible with both sides. Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; UN General Assembly records.
• Montreux applied even-handedly. Türkiye invoked Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention and says the Convention is applied to all belligerents without exception. Turkish officials describe this as a treaty obligation, not a political choice, and as a means of preventing naval escalation in the Black Sea. Sources: Montreux Convention text; Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements.
• Mediation as a Charter function. Ankara frames its role under UN Charter Article 33 and the general duty to settle disputes peacefully. The Presidency describes Istanbul as a venue open to every party, and the grain deal as a UN-anchored arrangement and not a Turkish bilateral one. Sources: Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye; UN Charter.
• Impartiality as a precondition. Turkish officials have repeatedly said that a mediator must keep channels open with all sides and avoid becoming a party. Ankara applies the same principle to Gaza, where it engages with all actors, and to the Horn of Africa. Sources: Presidency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs public statements.
• Institutional reform link. Ankara says that the grain deal's dependence on ad hoc consent shows why the Security Council needs reform; see the legal case for 'The World Is Bigger Than Five'. Source: Turkish statements at the UN.

Legal observations

The mirror-text model had clear advantages. It gave each belligerent a face-saving route to participation, it placed the UN in a neutral monitoring role, and it avoided direct recognition issues between the parties. Its limits were also clear. No independent dispute-settlement body existed, there was no sanction for withdrawal beyond reputational cost, and the parallel MoU gave Russia a ground to link continued participation to its own export demands. A mediator that signs texts as a co-party, as Türkiye did, takes on moral and diplomatic obligations, but it is not a guarantor in the sense of the 1960 Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee. Reciprocity enforced the deal, and when one side's expectations diverged, the arrangement ended.

Beyond Ukraine: Gaza and the Horn of Africa

Türkiye's other mediation files show the same preference for hosting, convening and co-signing over coercion.

• Gaza. Türkiye maintains contacts with the main Palestinian actors and, according to official statements, took part with Egypt, Qatar and the United States in the October 2025 Sharm el-Sheikh ceasefire arrangements. Critics say Ankara's sharp criticism of Israel limits its usefulness as a neutral broker, and Ankara replies that engagement with every party, including those others will not meet, is what makes an intermediary useful.
• Horn of Africa. The Ankara Declaration of 11 December 2024 ended a dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia that had been triggered by Ethiopia's January 2024 memorandum on sea access. The Declaration affirmed Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and committed the parties to technical talks on commercial maritime access, known as the 'Ankara Process'. Türkiye acted as host and facilitator, not as a party to the settlement.

Ankara's Ukraine, Gaza and Horn of Africa files all share one structural feature: the text binds the parties, while the mediator supplies venue, channels and logistics. Comparative studies are available from Gazetteer of Nations and The Political Anatomy.

Source Comparison

Question	Common international framing	Turkish and primary-source framing
Who agreed the grain deal?	Often presented as a single Russia–Ukraine agreement brokered by Türkiye and the UN	Two parallel texts, each signed with Türkiye and the UN; Russia and Ukraine did not sign with each other (UN and Presidency records)
Why did it end?	Russia 'withdrew' or 'weaponized' food	Russia suspended participation, citing unmet MoU commitments; Türkiye urged continuation and proposed restoring it (Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements)
Is Türkiye neutral?	Sometimes called 'balancing' or 'hedging'	Ankara cites Montreux, its UN votes on territorial integrity and non-participation in sanctions as evidence of principled non-belligerence
Who enforced it?	Assumed to be the UN	The JCC coordinated; there was no external enforcement body, and compliance depended on reciprocity
What are prisoner exchanges?	Treated as a form of mediation by Türkiye	Governed by Geneva III; parties execute them, Türkiye and others facilitate, and the ICRC has its own role

Readers should compare each claim against the signed texts and UN reporting, which are published and available for direct verification. This follows our editorial principles.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Parallel (mirror) texts: two agreements with matching obligations, each signed with a common third party, used to avoid direct signature between adversaries.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): the Istanbul-based body of Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and UN officials that ran the grain corridor.
• Article 19, Montreux Convention: the provision restricting passage of belligerent warships through the Turkish Straits; see what Articles 19, 20 and 21 actually say.
• Article 33, UN Charter: lists negotiation, mediation, conciliation and other means for peaceful dispute settlement.
• Good offices vs. mediation: good offices connect the parties, while mediation involves proposals and active process management. Türkiye's Ukraine role has mixed both.

Related reading: Nomos Orbis home, Türkiye's diplomacy overview at Record of Nations, the Nomos Orbis FAQ on sources and method.

Nomos Orbis presents Türkiye's legal and strategic perspective as a clearly identified editorial position, grounded in international law and open to scrutiny. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official archives and court records, which readers are encouraged to verify directly.